

**2015 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
10 June 2015

Original: English

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appropriate forum for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

16. Like many other countries, Mexico hoped that the current Review Conference would lead to the launching of a clearly defined and irrevocable process

negotiations on a treaty banning the production of

39. **Ms. Dominguez** (Cuba) said that 45 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear-weapon States had yet to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The so-called step-by-step approach was being used by some States parties to justify the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and thus postpone achievement of the goal of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must provide legal and unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

40. The current Conference must not produce the same regrettable outcome as the 2010 Review Conference, which, for lack of consensus on disarmament proposals, had produced a Final Document that reflected only the personal views of the President. States parties should review both the positive and the negative aspects of implementation of the Treaty so as to propose effective, practical actions for the next five years. The fact that the large majority of the 22 disarmament-related actions contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference had not been implemented undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

41. The current Review Conference should adopt an updated and strengthened action plan on nuclear disarmament with specific timelines for each action, in order to bolster the credibility of the Conference's work and to ensure that the commitments made should not remain pending indefinitely. The Main Committee should recommend a number of practical actions that would lead to the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty, including a commitment to initiate negotiations on, and conclude, an international instrument by which nuclear-weapon States would provide unconditional and legally binding assurances that they would never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

42. Nuclear-weapon States should commit to renounce definitively the concept of nuclear deterrence and any role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and in security policies; the maintenance of programmes for modernizing existing nuclear weapons and developing new types of nuclear weapons; and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the Conference should recommend initiating in 2015 multilateral negotiations on an international nuclear disarmament convention that would prohibit and eliminate all

nuclear weapons within 20 years in a safe, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

43. **Mr. Bylica** (European Union) sa()T8th

Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. It called on all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm the existing security assurances noted by United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and recalled in Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). It welcomed the signature by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, recalling that the Russian Federation had specifically made a commitment under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to respect for international law in international relations, including in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

47. **Mr. Bugajski** (Poland) said that while his delegation welcomed the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty, it was concerned at the violation by the Russian Federation of its commitment under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. It called on the Russian Federation to comply with its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. All categories of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, should be included in future talks between the Russian Federation and the United States, and his delegation hoped to see specific reference to that issue in the Review Conference's final document¹²

arrangements to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space had an extremely negative impact; in that connection, he supported the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties.

53. The fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet come into force also affected modern international relations. Conventional weapons in Europe also did not facilitate progress in nuclear disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe had been concluded 25 years earlier and plans to negotiate a new agreement that might correspond better to current realities remained a mere intention.

54. With the conclusion of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Russian Federation had virtually exhausted the possibilities of reducing its nuclear arsenal

67. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a priority, and there was no good argument for putting it off further. The Treaty's verification system had been fully tried and tested, and waiting for further ratifications was no excuse for lack of progress. The start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which should be universal and verifiable and not a voluntary moratorium, was a priority. The Test-Ban Treaty had set a qualitative limit to the development of nuclear weapons; a fissile material cut-off treaty should now set a quantitative limit in that regard.

68. France welcomed the discussions by the group of governmental experts on such a treaty and the adoption of its report by consensus. The discussions had gone further than ever before, and although the differences in positions had seemed to all to be surmountable, the Conference on Disarmament had held the most constructive discussions ever on a fissile material cut-off treaty in June 2014. France would like to build on the success of the group of governmental experts and had therefore submitted a draft fissile material cut-off treaty to the Conference on Disarmament that was ambitious, realistic and verifiable, and that proposed irreversible measures. The next logical step towards multilateral disarmament would be the start of

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members of the Security Council aimed at improving the International Monitoring System and regularly sponsored projects in support of the Organization. A recent example was a successful workshop providing training on the use of new open-source tools and technologies for verification purposes. The United Kingdom had provided a significant amount of equipment and technical expertise to the Organization's Integrated Field Exercise 2014, which demonstrated a change in the Organization's on-site inspection capability.

75. The United Kingdom had announced in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All facilities used for the production of such material had been or were being decommissioned, or used only for peaceful purposes. All enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom since 1995 had been conducted under European Atomic Energy Community safeguards and the terms of the safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and all civil nuclear material in the country was subject to those arrangements. In 1998, the United Kingdom had placed all nuclear material excess to its defence requirements under international safeguards.

76. The start and early conclusion of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material was an essential step on the road to complete global nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should adopt a balanced and comprehensive programme of work and subsequently negotiate such a treaty. The United Kingdom was pleased that the group of governmental experts established on that issue had been able to produce a substantive report.

77. Verification was likely to play an increasing and crucial role in disarmament measures. The United Kingdom was a world leader on research in the development of verification capabilities for warhead dismantlement, on which the United Kingdom/Norway Initiative, the first and only such established project between a nuclear-weapon State and a non-nuclear-weapon State, continued to make progress. The United Kingdom also had a long-running bilateral verification

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or in the wider public domain that meaningful progress had been achieved since 2010, as high alert levels continued to play a central role in the doctrines of certain countries. In keeping with action 5 of the 2010 action plan, the De-alerting Group had submitted a working paper (N -1.20.843 (l)7 1D [(ha)-8(d)12(b)>BDC B(.20.843 (l)O24(mb)>BF)922.05701 0.84W0ctr0 Tcin)12(73